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Abstract—The advent of Industrial IoT (IIoT) along with
Cloud computing has brought a huge paradigm shift in manufac-
turing industries resulting in yet another industrial revolution,
Industry 4.0. Huge amounts of delay-sensitive data of diverse
nature are being generated which needs to be locally processed
and secured due to its sensitivity. But, the low-end IoT devices are
unable to handle huge computational overheads. Also, the semi-
trusted nature of Cloud introduces several security concerns. To
address these issues, this work proposes a secure Fog-based IIoT
architecture by suitably plugging a number of security features
into it and by offloading some of the tasks judiciously to fog
nodes. These features secure the system alongside reducing the
trust and burden on the cloud and resource-constrained devices
respectively. We validate our proposed architecture through
both theoretical overhead analysis and practical experimentation
including simulation study and testbed implementation.
Index Terms—IIoT, Industry 4.0, Fog computing, Security
& Privacy, Re-Encryption, Partial decryption, Homomorphic
Encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial IoT (IIoT) refers to the use of certain IoT tech-
nologies including various smart objects capable of monitor-
ing, collecting, analyzing and making intelligent choices in an
industrial setting without human intervention for the better-
ment of its environment [1]. With the emergence of the fourth
industrial revolution, Industry 4.0 specially emphasizes on the
manufacturing industry scenarios. Industry 4.0 is focused on
digitizing and integrating all physical processes across the
entire organization [2]. Thus, it is a major paradigm shift
from the previous centrally controlled automated machines
and processes into a more decentralized manufacturing. This
enables the smart factories to effectively handle the growing
complexities and situations like complete shutdown of assem-
bly lines while simultaneously carrying out production more
efficiently [3].
Both IIoT and Industry 4.0 are attempts of making the
industrial systems more scalable, robust and faster in terms of
response as well as production. However, for effectively real-
izing these systems to its full potential, extending the features
of the cloud closer to the end devices for locally processing
tasks in a timely manner is an essential requirement. Smart
industrial equipments are resource constrained and performing
J. Sengupta and S. Das Bit are with the Department of Computer Science &
Technology, Indian Institute of Engineering Science & Technology, Howrah,
India, E-Mail: (jayasree202@gmail.com ; sdasbit@yahoo.co.in).
S. Ruj is with CSIRO, Data61, Australia and Cryptology and Security
Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, E-Mail: (sush-
mita.ruj@gmail.com ; sushmita.ruj@csiro.au).
Manuscript submitted : 15 July, 2019 ; Revised : 26 December, 2019 and
28 March 2020 ; Accepted : 12 May 2020.
costly computations would drain them out quickly. Moreover,
computations in the cloud has its own drawbacks such as large
response time, disruptions in the underlying communication
networks and data security and privacy issues [4]. One of the
solutions to these problems is to introduce a middleware such
as fog which can perform most of the tasks locally instead
of getting them processed either in the end devices or remote
server/cloud. Fog Computing maybe defined as “an extension
of the cloud computing paradigm that provides computation,
storage, and networking services between end devices and
traditional cloud servers” [5]. Primarily, fog computing brings
in the advantages of scalability, better Quality of Service
(QoS), agility, efficiency and decentralization. Apart from
these the potential of fog computing is widespread as it reduces
latency thereby reducing cost, preserves network bandwidth
and also provides better security [6].
We observe from the above that introducing fog as a mid-
dleware in IIoT to eliminate the drawbacks brought about
by the cloud-centric architecture will potentially benefit the
industries. The major contributions of our work are:
• We propose our secure Fog-based IIoT architecture by
suitably plugging a number of important security features
into it.
• The proposed architecture reduces the overhead on low-
end devices and the latency in decision making alongside
eliminating trust on the cloud.
• We validate the architecture with a theoretical overhead
analysis and practical experimentation including simulation
and testbed implementation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II highlights the Related Work. Section III describes
our proposed Secure Fog-based IIoT architecture. Section
IV establishes the proposed design. Section V highlights the
performance evaluation of our architecture. Finally, Section VI
concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section provides a brief overview on : (a) the proposed
IIoT based architectures and (b) the IIoT based security
schemes proposed in literature.
The works [7, 8] have focused on proposing improved
architectures for IIoT, specifically with respect to Industry 4.0.
Wan et al. [7], have proposed a Software-defined IIoT archi-
tecture to introduce greater flexibility in the network. However,
Software Defined Networking (SDN) based IIoT architecture
has a few drawbacks like, standardizing SDN is still under
process, therefore standardization of SDN based IIoT is a
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complex task. SDN-based IIoT acts as a centralized controlling
system which introduces latency in data forwarding. To reduce
this problem of latency, the works [8, 9] have proposed the
use of fog as a middleware in IIoT between the industrial
devices and the cloud to promote distributed controlling of
network traffic. However, their proposed architecture haven’t
considered any security measures to protect the data exchanged
within the system and is therefore susceptible to various kinds
of security threats and attacks like tampering.
The works [10–12] have proposed privacy preserving,
lightweight or blockchain-based authentication schemes to
achieve mutual authentication between various users and/or
devices within the IIoT systems. In the context of data au-
thentication, [13, 14] have proposed Certificateless Signature
(CLS) schemes for IIoT systems to achieve the said objectives.
The work [15] has proposed an Ethereum blockchain-enabled
mechanism using Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) to cre-
ate a reliable IIoT environment. Furthermore, Huang et al. [16]
have proposed a credit-based proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism
for IIoT devices to protect sensitive data confidentiality.
From the above discussions it is clear that preserving the
security and privacy of the system as well as the data in transit
have been less investigated. Further, decentralizing the entire
network traffic to bring computation to the edge while ensuring
security is another concern. At the same time reducing latency
in real time data processing is also essential. This motivates
us to design a secure Fog-based IIoT architecture addressing
the aforementioned issues.
III. SECURE FOG-BASED IIOT ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we propose our Secure Fog-based IIoT
Architecture in the context of Industry 4.0. But before that
we discuss the major needs/requirements for incorporating
security features in this architecture.
A. Security and Privacy Requirements
The major requirements are as follows:
• The devices at the perception layer (e.g. industrial robots)
and the fog nodes belong to different vendors. Thus, it is
extremely important to build a trust relationship between
them by authenticating each other.
• Unauthorized access to either the data from the perception
layer devices or the computing resources of the fog nodes
should be prevented.
• Preserving integrity of raw data in transit and thereby
preventing tampering is another important concern.
• The cloud is considered to be semi-trusted or at times
malicious, therefore it is extremely important to preserve
confidentiality of data stored in the cloud. Also retaining
the control over usage of such data is a concern.
• Reducing the computational burden on the resource-
constrained perception layer devices is a necessity.
• Finally, securely performing computations on encrypted data
stored in the cloud is another challenge .
To include each of the aforementioned security requirements
in an industrial setting, we primarily propose our Secure Fog-
based IIoT architecture.
B. Our Proposed System Architecture
The architecture is shown in Figure 1 and is composed of
four layers, namely the perception layer, fog layer, cloud layer
and application layer.
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Fig. 1: Secure Fog-based IIoT Architecture
Perception Layer: This layer consists of industrial devices
equipped with different kind of sensors (e.g. temperature),
RFID tags and surveillance cameras as per requirement. It
also consists of smart equipments (e.g. robots) required to
automate industrial processes, transport raw goods etc. The
main functions of this layer include data collection, command
execution and authentication of devices as well as data (using
signatures). The raw data collected by IoT devices in this layer
are transferred to the Fog layer using some edge gateway like
Wifi Access points.
Fog Layer: The fog layer is the additional layer we have
introduced in our proposed architecture which comprises of
fog nodes. Fog nodes are devices that necessarily reside close
to the edge of the network and are often the first point of
contact to the IoT end-devices [9]. To implement this, the fog
layer may comprise of smart devices like smartphones, tablets,
laptops, etc. or even virtual servers and smart mobile agents
like humans carrying smartphones/tablets depending on the
need of the application as mentioned in Section II.
We have introduced the fog layer in our architecture, to
primarily achieve three main objectives : (a) Minimizing the
latency in decision making by extending the cloud closer to
where the devices are (b) Offloading the major computations
from the resource constrained end devices and/or honest but
curious cloud servers to the more trustworthy fog nodes and
(c) Preserving the battery life of the resource-constrained
IoT devices for a longer period by offloading the intensive
computations. In our proposed architecture, the processing
of the defined security features are distributed between the
different layers in the following manner: the tasks which
are to be executed by the IoT devices only for successful
implementation of the defined security features are performed
in the perception layer. Rest of the tasks which are flexible
enough to be performed either by the IoT devices/proxy
servers in Cloud or by the fog nodes are offloaded to the
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fog layer. This mechanism relieves the trust and burden on
the cloud and resource-constrained devices respectively.
The IoT devices that sense raw data forward it to their nearest
fog node. This fog node then performs either of the following
two actions depending on the type of data it has received. If
the data is highly time-sensitive, the fog node analyzes it and
sends a control command back to the respective device. On
the other hand, if the data is less time-sensitive, it is forwarded
to the cloud for long term storage and/or big data or historical
analysis. The thousands of fog nodes along the industrial floor
also send periodic summaries of the data collected by them
to the cloud for further analysis purposes. In this way the
fog layer effectively bridges the gap between the IoT devices
and the cloud and also performs some major computationally
intensive tasks for securing the system on behalf of both of
them. According to our setup, out of all the fog nodes, a few
of them may behave as a proxy as per requirement.
Cloud Layer: The cloud layer consists of different kinds
of servers (e.g. database server) performing various kind of
activities. The cloud is responsible for storing huge chunks of
data and performing other tasks (e.g. big data analysis). Based
on these, the cloud issues and forwards instructions to the fog
nodes. In our proposed secure Fog-based IIoT architecture,
data is generally stored in the cloud in encrypted format.
Application Layer For an industrial setting, the application
layer consists of users (e.g. production manager) working
on smart terminals to manage the entire workflow of the
industry. The users download required data from the cloud
using Internet which acts as the cloud gateway. Based on the
analysis performed on these data, an intelligent decision is
made to improve the overall quality of production, service or
equipment management in the industry.
IV. PROPOSED DESIGN
A wide range of security vulnerabilities exists in the context
of IIoT and Industry 4.0. Therefore, in this design, we choose
an existing security scheme for each of these features and
propose suitable modifications to it to enhance the security
and performance of our proposed architecture. A couple of
exemplary industrial scenarios where these features are essen-
tial to apply are discussed in Appendix A. A common bilinear
map is used for most of the below-mentioned schemes. Two
groups G1 and GT of large prime order q is chosen where
g is the generator of G1. The pairing is defined as a map
eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT . The detailed description about bilinear
maps and pairing concepts are available in Appendix B.
A. Access Control and Authentication for Devices
Authentication and access control are two of the most
important concerns in an industrial IoT setting. Authentication
between devices within the same layer as well as devices
across layers should be incorporated in an industrial setting to
build a trust relationship between such devices. Moreover, only
trusted fog nodes should be allowed to access IoT device’s
data, or even issue commands to an IoT device which brings
access control into light.
The IoT devices are generally resource constrained and
authentication/access control requires a lot of cryptographic
operations. Therefore, the major computationally intensive
operations need to be outsourced to the fog nodes, in order to
save battery life of IoT devices. The work [17] has proposed
an Attribute Credential Based Public Key Cryptography (AC-
PKC) scheme for a fog based IIoT architecture which can
be used both for authentication as well as access control.
Therefore, we adopt their scheme in our proposed architecture
to achieve its benefits and completely secure our architecture.
B. Secure Data Aggregation
The sensory data that are transferred to the fog nodes for
analysis can get tampered midway leading to drastic effects
like severe damage to a machinery or even complete shutdown
of an assembly line. To deal with such unprecedented condi-
tions it is extremely important to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of the data (raw data/commands). Signing the
data (i.e. digital signature) not only ensures that the data is
authenticated by the sender but also signifies that the data
is not tampered and is a good choice in such cases. BLS
Signature scheme [18] is one of the widely used signature
schemes. However, if every frame is to be signed, the size of
the signature becomes long. Aggregate BLS signature [18] is
shorter in size and has a property that size of the aggregate
signature is constant irrespective of the number of signatures
being aggregated. Let us assume that an industrial equipment
(E) in the perception layer is sending multiple data packets
(D1, ..., Dn) within a short frame to a fog device (F). Figure 2
demonstrates in detail the exact steps performed by each of the
entities in our proposed architecture to implement Aggregate
BLS and the interactions between them.
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Industrial
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1. Generates biliner maps
 2. Chooses cryptographic hash   
     functions
 3. Calculates public (pkE) and     
     private keys (skE) for E
Sense data packets
D1......Dn
Generates signed messages
and then aggregates them
to generate the aggregated
signature
σ
∗
agg
Verifies the received
aggregated signature
using pkE
pkE and skE
D1......Dn and 
σ
∗
agg
Perception Layer Fog Layer
Fig. 2: Sequence Diagram for Secure Data Aggregation
Setup: The setup phase is performed by a Trusted Authority
(TA) who generates bilinear map as defined in Section IV. TA
also chooses a cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1. All the public parameters are published and the private key
(sk = x ∈ Zq) and public key (pk = gx) for each individual
device is calculated. Thus, E acquires its public key (pkE) and
private key (skE) respectively.
Sign: Sign(Mj , ski) → σ. The sign phase is performed by
E when it wishes to send data packets to F. For a group of
packets D1, ..., Dn, each of the individual data packets and
private key (skE) is taken as input. The sign function, then
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returns the signed messages σ1 ... σn which are calculated as
σj = H1(Dj)
skE
Aggregate: Aggregate(σagg(D1, ..., Dn), σ,M) → σ∗agg .
Aggregation is also performed by E as σ∗agg =
∏n
j=1 σj .
Verify: F receives a group of data packets D1 ... Dn along
with the aggregated signature (σ∗agg). F then verifies the
signature, using the public key of E (pkE) as follows:
n∏
j=1
eˆ(pkE , H1(Dj)) = eˆ(σ
∗
agg, g)
If the verification takes place successfully, the fog node is
assured that all the received data is original (i.e. not tampered).
In this way, the objective is achieved with minimum computa-
tional overhead as well as reduced latency which is extremely
suitable for an IIoT environment.
C. Secure Data Sharing with Multiple Users
In an industrial environment, huge amounts of sensitive
data needs to be outsourced to the cloud for sharing among
various users for analysis purposes. The traditional approaches
of securely sharing data only with authorized users (e.g.
asymmetric encryption) have several limitations (e.g. huge
computation and bandwidth cost to the data owner) [19].
Moreover, sharing the same data with multiple users require
the sender to encrypt the data individually for each user. This
would become a tedious and computationally intensive task
for the sender. To achieve end to end data confidentiality
during data sharing with authorized users, re-encryption of
data is a promising choice. Re-Encryption is a mechanism
which allows a proxy (typically a third party) to alter (i.e.
re-encrypt) an encrypted message from a sender in such a
way so that it can easily be decrypted by the recipient using
his/her own private key [19]. Moreover, the message remains
secret from the proxy. Even if the encrypted data needs
to be shared with multiple users, the sender just needs to
generate multiple re-encryption keys. Using these key, the
proxy would re-encrypt the message for each individual user
thereby drastically reducing the computational burden on the
sender.
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Fig. 3: Sequence Diagram for Secure Data Sharing with Multiple
Users
The existing re-encryption schemes in literature [19–22]
utilize the cloud for key management and encryption-based
access control apart from data storage. We modify the Cer-
tificateless Proxy Re-Encryption (CL-PRE) [19] scheme to
eliminate trust on the Cloud. We achieve this by delegating
the key management and re-encryption task to the fog nodes
to fit into our proposed secure Fog-based IIoT architecture.
Figure 3 demonstrates in detail the exact steps performed by
each of the entities within our proposed architecture and the
interactions between them. Let us assume that an industrial
equipment in the perception layer acts as the sender (S) and
there is a data analyst (R) at the industry, acting as a user.
PKG Setup: The Private Key Generator (PKG) generates a
bilinear map as defined in Section IV. PKG also chooses two
cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 :
GT → G1. Finally, it randomly picks an integer, mk ∈ Z∗q as
master key to publish gmk. For each of its members the PKG
issues and forwards a partial private key as Pi = gimk (gi
is calculated as per [19]). S and R receive their own partial
private keys as PS and PR respectively.
Key Generation: Each member then randomly chooses a
secret integer ki ∈ Z∗q . Using Pi and ki, the members then
generate their private keys as per [19]. Thus, both S and
R derive their private keys as skS and skR respectively.
Similarly, S and R also derive their public keys as pkS and pkR
respectively (according to [19]). For decryption delegation, S
chooses a random integer d, the tuples < skS , d > are kept
secret whereas gd is published as a part of pkS .
Encryption: Whenever S has some sensed data (say m), and
it needs to provide decryption delegation to R, S randomly
chooses r. The encryption to generate a ciphertext (c′) takes
place as follows:
c′ = C ′S(m) = (g
dr, gr,m.eˆ(grS , g
d.kS )) = (c0, c1, c2)
Re-Encryption Key Generation: For delegating decryption
capabilities to the receiver (R), the sender (S) randomly
chooses y ∈ GT and computes the re-encryption key (rkS,R)
as follows:
rkS,R = (g
−skS
S .H
d
2 (y), CR(y)) = (c4, CR(y))
where CR(y) = gr,m.eˆ(grR, g
skR). S then forwards a 2-tuple
< c′, rkS,R > packet to the nearest Fog Node. The fog node on
receiving this 2-tuple packet, analyzes it and decides whether
the data needs to be forwarded to the cloud or not. If the data
is meant for the cloud, then it forwards the packet to another
fog node acting as a proxy. Otherwise, it acts on the data itself
and provides a feedback to S.
Re-Encryption by Fog: The Fog node acting as a proxy, on
receiving < c′, rkS,R > packet, performs two tasks. Firstly,
it extracts c′ and stores it in the cloud. Next, it re-encrypts c′
under rkS,R to generate c′′ as follows:
c′′ = c2.eˆ(c4, c1) = m.eˆ(Hd2 (y), c1)
Whenever R requests for this specific data, the cloud notifies
the respective Fog node from which it had received the
encrypted data. This particular Fog node then forwards a 3-
tuple < c0, c′′, CR(y) > packet to R.
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Decryption: R decrypts CR(y) as explained in [19] to retrieve
y. The plaintext message can then be revived by computing
c′′/eˆ(H2(y), c0) = m
This method reduces the trust dependency on the cloud by
delegating the key management and re-encryption task to the
fog nodes. Furthermore, fog nodes being a property of the
industry, are more trustworthy compared to the cloud.
D. Fine-Grained Access Control with Improved Performance
As Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) can be malicious, data
in encrypted form needs to be stored in the cloud. However,
encryption and decryption requires complex operations which
is often quite expensive for resource constrained devices. To
handle such situations and simultaneously incorporate fine-
grained access control, fast offline/online encryption and out-
sourced partial decryption is introduced. Partial Decryption
is a phenomenon in which the data requester generates a
transformed version of the decryption key. This transformed
key allows a proxy (typically an untrusted third party) to
partially decrypt the ciphertext in a way so that it cannot
gain any information about the original message. This partially
decrypted ciphertext can then be fully decrypted by the data
requester without performing any costly operations.
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2. Generates public
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1. Senses raw
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2. Generates
Intermediate
Ciphertext (ICT)
and
Intermediate
State (IS)
Fog Node (F1)
<d, ICT, IS>
1. Generates C0
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Fig. 4: Sequence Diagram for Fine-Grained Access Control with
Improved Performance
The existing partial decryption schemes in literature [23–26]
utilize the cloud for outsourced decryption. We modify one
of the existing schemes [23], to promote the aforementioned
advantages as well as completely eliminate the need of trusting
the cloud by introducing the fog layer. Figure 4 illustrates
the exact steps to implement fine-grained access control using
partial decryption in our proposed architecture. Let us assume
that an industry has two plants (P1 and P2 respectively)
located at two distant places. A perception layer device (say
A1) in P1 is the data owner, who uploads data to the cloud
and another perception layer device (say A2) in P2 is the data
requester querying the same data.
Global Setup: This phase generates a bilinear map as defined
under Section IV. Every device in the perception layer has
a unique identifier (Id) and a cryptographic hash H1 which
maps Id to elements in G1.
Authority Setup: There are more than one Attribute Authority
(AA) in the system who controls different user attributes. For
each attribute k belonging to AA, it randomly chooses ak, bk ∈
Zq to generate pk and sk as per [23]. Therefore, an AA (i) in
P2 controlling device A2 publishes pki as its public key and
keeps ski secret.
The following two phases are performed at P1, which acts as
the data generator (as per our assumption).
Intermediate Encryption: Whenever a raw/sensory data (say
d) is generated by A1 it performs this phase. A1 chooses x = 1
to X (where X is the total number of attributes attached to
d) and uses the global parameters to generate the intermediate
ciphertext (ICT x∈[1,X]) and its intermediate state (ISx∈[1,X]).
A 3-tuple packet < d, ICT, IS > is then forwarded to the
nearest fog node (F1) [ICT and IS is calculated as per [23]].
Full Encrypt: The fog node (F1) on receiving this 3-tuple
packet uses the global parameters and the relevant public keys
to generate the final ciphertext (CT ). It randomly chooses
ms ∈ Zq to generate C0 = deˆ(g, g)ms . The additional cipher
texts C1 and C2 are calculated according to [23]. The final
ciphertext is then calculated as below and stored in the cloud.
CT = ((A, ρ∗), C0, {ICT,C1, C2, IS})x∈[1,X]
where A is a l×m access matrix with ρ mapping its rows to
attributes [23].
The following phases are executed at P2 where device A2 has
requested to access the data (d) generated by A1.
Key Generation: This phase is run by AA within whose range
A2 falls. For an attribute k, this node calculates and sends
Kk,IdA2 = g
akH1(IdA2)
bk to A2 (having IdA2).
Key Transformation: This phase is executed by A2, where it
chooses a random number r ∈ Zq to generate the transformed
key (TIdA2 = (K
1/r
k,IdA2
, H1(IdA2)
1/r). This transformed key
is then forwarded to the nearest fog node (F2) which down-
loads the requested data from the cloud.
Partial Decryption: F2 on receiving the transformed key
(TIdA2 ) and the downloaded ciphertext (CT ), uses the global
parameters to partially decrypt the ciphertext to produce
CT ′ = {CT1, CT2} (as per [23]), which is then sent to A2.
Full Decryption: A2 computes CT ′2 = CT
1/r
2 and CT =
CT ′2.CT1. Then, it computes CT
r = eˆ(g, g)
ms to obtain d =
C0/CT
r.
The computationally intensive tasks (e.g. partial decryption)
are performed by the fog node (F2). This completely elimi-
nates trust on the cloud and also reduces the computational
burden on the low-end perception layer devices.
E. Secure Computation
To protect sensitive data from honest but curious cloud
servers, data is encrypted. However, this setting brings in
a new challenge of performing computations on encrypted
data. Traditionally, fully homomorphic encryption was used
as solution which is not a practical choice. In order to reduce
the trust on cloud servers and burden on the users, secure
computation is delegated to the fog nodes in our architecture.
These nodes then perform computations on the encrypted data
stored in the cloud.
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skPF2 to retrieve
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Fig. 5: Sequence Diagram for Secure Computation
The existing techniques of delegating secure computations
in literature [27–29] propose using a proxy server to perform
the tasks on behalf of the cloud. However, in our secure Fog-
based IIoT architecture we propose offloading these tasks to
the fog nodes which is achieved by modifying one of the
existing schemes [27]. Figure 5 demonstrates in detail the
exact steps performed by the entities in our architecture to
achieve secure computation and the interactions between such
entities. Let us assume that an industry has two plants (P1
and P2) at different geographic locations. A Fog node acting
as a proxy (PF1) in P1 is the data owner who uploads the
encrypted data to the Cloud while another Fog node acting as
the proxy (PF2) in P2 is the data requester.
Setup: In this phase a Trusted Authority (TA) generates
security parameters for the entire industry. It also generates
a bilinear map as defined under Section IV.
Key Generation: Each of the Fog nodes acting as prox-
ies generate their own public-private key pair as per [27].
Both PF1 and PF2 derive their key pair as (pkPF1, skPF1)
= ((pk1(PF1), pk2(PF1)), skPF1) and (pkPF2, skPF2) =
((pk1(PF2), pk2(PF2)), skPF2) respectively.
Upload Encrypted Data: Encrypting a message (m) under
public key pki = (pk1i, pk2i) to generate cyphertext c =
(c1, c2) takes place as follows: [where y is chosen randomly
from Zq]
c1 = g
y ; c2 = pk
y
1i.m ...(a)
Whenever PF1 has a data (d) to upload to cloud for statistical
or historical analysis purposes, it first encrypts the data using
Eq. (a) under its own public key (pkPF1) to generate ciphertext
CT = (CT1, CT2).
When PF2 in P2 generates a query on this encrypted data
(CT) to the cloud, the cloud forwards < CT, f1 > to PF1
(where f1 is the evaluation function). PF1 then performs the
following four operations before forwarding the final analyzed
result back to the cloud.
Computation on Encrypted Data: Homomorphic Encryption
is used to perform computations on encrypted data (here
it only supports multiplicative homomorphism). Given two
ciphertexts ct = (ct1, ct2) and ct′ = (ct′1, ct
′
2), the resulting
evaluated ciphertext c′ = (c′1, c
′
2) under public key pki
= (pk1i, pk2i) is calculated as below: [where a is chosen
randomly from Zq and bˆ = b+ b′ + a mod q]
c′1 = ct1.ct
′
1.g
a = gb+b
′+a = gbˆ ...(b)
c′2 = ct2.ct
′
2.pk
a
1i = pk
b+b′+a
1i .m.m
′ = pkbˆ1i.m.m
′ ...(c)
PF2 calculates the encrypted meta-result res = (res1, res2)
for CT and f1 using his/her own public key pkPF1 following
Equations (b) and (c) above.
Re-Encryption Key Generation: The re-encryption key
rkPF1,PF2 using key pair of PF1 and public key of PF2
is calculated as per [27].
Re-Encryption: This phase transforms the meta-result (res)
encrypted under public key of PF1 to the one encrypted under
public key of PF2. Using res = (res1, res2) and rkPF1,PF2,
the transformed result res′ = (res′1, res
′
2) is calculated as per
[27].
Computation on Transformed Result: Here, PF1 again uses
homomorphic encryption to perform analysis on the trans-
formed result using public key of PF2 following Equations
(b) and (c). The final result res′′ = (res′′1 , res
′′
2) is sent to the
cloud. The cloud then replies PF2 with res′′.
Decryption: PF2 performs decryption of res′′ under its own
private key (skPF2) according to [27] to retrieve the original
result.
By using this mechanism, the trust on the cloud is completely
eliminated. Moreover, computations are performed by Fog
nodes which reduces the burden on the constrained industrial
machines. Further, the raw data is not exposed and only the en-
crypted final result is sent to the query requester which greatly
secures the system apart from saving network bandwidth.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of our proposed
architecture both theoretically and experimentally.
A. Theoretical Analysis
The computation and communication overheads are mea-
sured in terms of execution time and number of transmitting
bytes respectively. During analysis, we consider Type A pair-
ings where each group element is of size 128 bytes [30]. We
also consider SHA-256 as the cryptographic hash function
with message digest of size 32 bytes. Interested readers can
look into Appendix C for detailed calculation of overheads.
Table I summarizes the notations used.
TABLE I: Notations used for Theoretical Analysis
Notations Meaning
TP Time taken to perform a pairing operation
TM Time taken to perform a multiplication
TH Time taken to perform a hash operation
TE Time taken to perform an exponentiation
TD Time taken to perform a division
TS Time taken to perform a subtraction
n Number of data packets
|m| Size of one generated data
|Req msg| Size of one request
x Number of attributes
l Number of rows in access matrix A
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TABLE II: Comparison of Theoretical Overhead Analysis for Secure
Data Aggregation
Computation Overhead Communication Overhead (bytes)Devices Tasks Aggregate Bls BLS Aggregate BLS BLS
Sign n(TE + TH) n(TE + TH)IoT
Device Aggregate (n− 1)TH - n|m| + 96 n|m| + n*96
Fog Node Verify nTH+(n+ 1)TP nTH+2nTP - -
TABLE III: Theoretical Overhead Analysis of Secure Data Sharing
with Multiple Users
Entities Tasks ComputationOverhead
Communication
Overhead (bytes)
Key Generation 3TE
Encryption 4TE+TM+TPIoT Device
(Sender) Re-Encryption
Key Generation
4TE+TH+
TM+TP
640
Fog Node Re-Encryption TM+TP 384
TABLE IV: Theoretical Overhead Analysis for Fine-Grained Access
Control with Improved Performance
Devices Tasks ComputationOverhead
Communication
Overhead (bytes)
Intermediate
Encryption (At P1)
x(9TE+
4TM +3TP )
|m|+ x ∗ 640 (At P1)
Key Transform (At P2) 2TE+THIoT Device
Full Decrypt (At P2) 2TE+TM+TD+TP
160 (At P2)
Full Encrypt (At P1) TE+TM+TP+x(4TM+2TS )
x * 640
Fog Node Partial Decrypt (At P2) l(4TE+3TP +2TD+TM+TH )
256
TABLE V: Theoretical Overhead Analysis for Secure Computation
Entities Tasks Computation Overhead CommunicationOverhead (bytes)
Key Generation 2TE+TP
Encryption 2TE+TM
Computation on
Encrypted Data 4TM+2TE
Re-Encryption
Key Generation TE
Re-Encryption 2(TM+TE+TD)+TP
Fog Node
(At P1)
Computation on
Transformed Result 4TM+2TE
512
Key Generation 2TE+TPFog Node
(At P2) Decryption TP +TE+TD
|Req msg|
Secure Data Aggregation: The results (Table II) show that
the Communication Overhead of an IoT device is significantly
less for Aggregate BLS compared to BLS which is achieved
at the cost of a little extra computation.
Secure Data Sharing with Multiple Users: We conclude
from the results (Table III) that the task re-encryption (TM +
TP time) which is performed by Fog instead of a typical proxy
server makes our architecture more trustworthy.
Fine-Grained Access Control with Improved Performance:
The results (Table IV) justify that offloading of various tasks to
Fog nodes has successfully reduced the computational burden
on IoT devices and also eliminated trust on the cloud.
Secure Computation: We observe from the results (Table V)
that the fog nodes perform tasks which would otherwise have
been shared among some third party entities.
B. Experimental Analysis
1) Simulation: We evaluate the performance of Secure Data
Aggregation by simulating both BLS and Aggregate BLS.
Simulation Environment: We use two computers with differ-
ent specifications as shown in Table VI. Here, one computer
with relatively low specification acts as the Industrial Equip-
ment (E) and the other with higher specification acts as the
Fog Node (F). We develop two separate Python codes1 using
the blspy library to run in each of the computers.
TABLE VI: Specifications of the Simulation Environment
Specifications Industrial Equipment (E) Fog Node (F)
Memory 3.5GiB 7.7GiB
Processor Intel Core i5-7200UCPU @ 2.50GHz * 4
Intel Core i7-6700
CPU @ 3.40GHz * 8
OS 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.3LTS
64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.3
LTS
Disk 100.3 GB 455.1 GB
Fig. 6: Comparison of Simulation Results
Simulation Metrics: Here, signature generation and verifica-
tion time are used as metrics. Signature Generation Time is the
time taken to generate signatures for individual data packets.
Signature Verification Time is the amount of time the fog node
takes to verify the signatures of the received data packets.
Results and discussion: We conduct two sets of experiments.
For each set, the average results of ten independent runs for
each input size has been registered.
In the first set of experiments, we plot (Figure 6) the Signature
Generation Time with varying number of data packets. We
observe that signature generation time for Aggregate BLS is
more than normal BLS. For example, when the number of data
packets transferred is 7, Aggregate BLS takes 8.9ms more
compared to BLS to generate signatures. In the second set
of experiment, we plot (Figure 6) the Signature Verification
Time with varying number of data packets. We observe that
verification time of Aggregate BLS is less than BLS. For
example, when the number of data packets transferred is 7,
Aggregate BLS takes 18.9ms less compared to BLS to verify
signatures.
The simulation results clearly conform to the results obtained
through theoretical analysis in Table II. Further, the overall
execution time of Aggregate BLS is less than BLS.
1https://tinyurl.com/SecureArchitectureCodes
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2) Testbed Implementation: We implement Secure Data
Sharing and validate its performance using a testbed setup.
Testbed Setup: Experimentation is conducted through testbed
whose detailed design and description is shown in Appendix
D. The specifications of devices used in the testbed are shown
in Table VII. We have developed separate C codes1 for each
of the devices involved in the setup with the help of PBC and
GMP libraries to implement our proposed security feature.
Through our experimentation we examine the execution times
of the tasks performed by each of the devices individually.
TABLE VII: Testbed Setup Specifications
Specifications Sender(Raspberry Pi)
Fog Node
(Laptop)
Data Analyst
(Laptop)
Memory 1 GBB 3.5 GiB 7.7 GiB
Processor Cortex-A53, armv7l@1200MHz * 4
Intel Core i5-7200U
CPU @ 2.50GHz * 4
Intel Core i7-6700
CPU @ 3.40GHz * 8
OS 32-bit Raspbian 64-bit Ubuntu18.04.3
64-bit Ubuntu
18.04.3
Disk 16 GB 100.3 GB 455.1 GB
TABLE VIII: Experimental Results
Tasks Execution Time (in ms)
PKG Setup 9.964
Key Generation (Sender) 30.317
Key Generation (Receiver) 2.311
Encryption 57.717
Re-Encryption Key Generation 45.997
Re-Encryption 0.723
Decryption 0.581
Results and discussion: In our experiment, Type A pairings
are used which are constructed on the curve y2 = x3+x over
the field Fq for some prime q = 3 mod 4 with base field size
of 512 bits. The average execution times obtained after ten
independent runs for each task are shown in Table VIII.
We observe from the results obtained in Table VIII that the
execution times of each of the tasks lie within a feasible range
and is suitable for IIoT scenarios. This conforms to the results
obtained through theoretical analysis in Table III. Moreover,
re-encryption which has been delegated to the fog nodes also
takes almost negligible time but provides more trustworthiness.
C. Metrics of Success
We highlight the metrics of success based on the perfor-
mance evaluation results of our proposed architecture. The
detailed description is available in Appendix E.
• More Secure: Plugging and playing a number of security
feature in an integrated manner while keeping overheads
within an acceptable limit.
• Reduced Overhead on Low End Devices: Applying ap-
propriate securing scheme and offloading tasks from low
end devices to fog nodes suitably.
• Reduced Latency: Offloading major tasks judiciously to
the powerful fog nodes in general and applying appropriate
securing schemes in particular.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the rising popularity of IIoT and Industry 4.0, several
limitations both in terms of networking and security/privacy
have emerged. Thus, we incorporate a few modified security
features to fit into our proposed Fog based IIoT architecture.
Through each of these features, we have shown how the trust
dependency on the cloud gets eliminated while successfully
using it for storage and archival purpose. Further, we have
shown that by offloading several computationally intensive
tasks to the fog nodes, the battery life of the resource-
constrained end devices is greatly saved. This architecture also
minimizes the latency in decision making thereby improving
performance. Finally, we have validated the performance of
our proposed architecture through theoretical analysis and
practical implementation. In future, we are planning to incor-
porate additional security features to develop a more realistic
architecture suitable for industrial scenarios.
APPENDIX A
EXEMPLARY INDUSTRIAL SCENARIOS
Here, we describe a couple of exemplary industrial scenarios
to justify the need of including various security features into
our proposed Fog based IIoT architecture.
• An industry may decide not to allow the workers in the
inventory to access data in the production floor and vice-
versa. To incorporate this, the industries require proper
access control mechanisms.
• The data packet containing sensed temperature data (say
above normal temperature) from a specific machine gets
intercepted by an adversary and is tampered (to normal
temperature) before being delivered to the nearest fog
node. In such a case, the fog node being completely
unaware of the situation will not take the necessary
actions leading to damage of the machine. To handle such
unprecedented situations, protecting the confidentiality
and integrity of raw data in transit is a necessity.
APPENDIX B
BILINEAR MAPS AND PAIRING CONCEPT
A bilinear map is a map eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT where G1
is a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. The group G1 is a
subgroup of the additive group of points of an elliptic curve
E/Fp. The group GT is a subgroup of the multiplicative group
of a finite field F∗p2 [31]. The map has the following properties
[31]:
• Bilinear: For all P, Q ∈ G1 and for ∀ c,d ∈ Z∗q , we have:
eˆ(cP, dQ) = eˆ(cP,Q)d = eˆ(P, dQ)c = eˆ(P,Q)cd
• Non-degenerate: If P is a generator of G1, then the
following happens:
∀P ∈ G1, P 6= 0⇒ eˆ(P, P ) = G2 (eˆ (P, P )
generates G2)
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
eˆ(P,Q) ∀ P,Q ∈ G1.
APPENDIX C
THEORETICAL OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In this part, we discuss in detail the computation and
communication overheads for each of the schemes mentioned
in Section IV.
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A. Secure Data Aggregation
Computation Overhead: In this scheme, the computation
overhead of an IoT device for signing a single data packet is
(TE+TH ) and is same for both Aggregate BLS and BLS. For
n number of data packets it will be n(TE+TH). In Aggregate
BLS, an additional time is required to aggregate n signatures
and is equal to (n− 1)TH .
Communication Overhead: Contrary to the above discussion,
the communication overhead of an IoT device is significantly
less in case of Aggregate BLS compared to BLS. Here, IoT
device has to send only a single aggregated signature of
96 bytes [16] along with the n data packets with size |m|.
Thus, communication overhead for Aggregate BLS is equal
to n|m|+ 96 bytes. However, in case of BLS, the device has
to send n signatures of 96 bytes each in addition to n data
packets with size |m|.
We observe from the results that the Communication Overhead
of an IoT device is significantly less for Aggregate BLS
compared to BLS. We achieve this at the cost of a little
extra computation in Aggregate BLS which is on the basis
of execution time. We also observe that for a Fog Node,
Computation Overhead is less in case of Aggregate BLS com-
pared to BLS. However, for BLS it increases significantly with
number of data packets. Thus, Aggregate BLS is advantageous
to implement in our Fog based IIoT architecture.
B. Secure Data Sharing with Multiple Users
Computation Overhead: To implement the access control
scheme, the computation overhead of IoT device is the re-
sultant computation overhead for Key Generation, Encryption
and Re-Encryption Key Generation.
Key Generation = TE (private key) + TE (public key) + TE
(gd) = 3TE
Encryption = TE (c0) + TE (c1) + (2TE + TM + TP ) (for c2)
= 4TE + TM + TP
Re-Encryption Key Generation = (2TE + TH ) (for c4) +
(2TE + TM + TP ) (for CR(y)) = 4TE + TH + TM + TP
Communication Overhead: As explained under Section IV-
C, an IoT device sends a 2-tuple packet < c′, rkS,R > to a
Fog node. The communication overhead depends on the size
of each of these tuples.
c′ = 128 (c0) + 128 (c1) + 128 (c2) bytes= 384 bytes
rkS,R = 128 bytes (c4) + 128 bytes (CR(y)) = 256 bytes
Therefore, total communication overhead = (384 + 256) bytes
= 640 bytes
We conclude from the above discussion that the task re-
encryption which takes TM+TP time was originally supposed
to be performed by the proxy server. By offloading this task
to the Fog node we make the architecture more trustworthy.
C. Fine-Grained Access Control with Improved Performance
Computation Overhead: To implement this feature, the com-
putation overhead of IoT device at Plant2 (P2) is due to the
Key Transformation and Full Decrypt.
Key Transformation = (2TE + TH ) (for transformed key)
Full Decrypt = TE (CT ′2) + TM (CT ) + (TE+TP ) (for CT
r)
+ TD (d) = 2TE + TM + TD + TP
Communication Overhead: The IoT device at Plant2 (P2)
sends the transformed key to the Fog Node which is the
communication overhead of the IoT device.
Transformed Key = 128 bytes (part of the key) + 32 bytes
(hashing) = 160 bytes
In the absence of a Fog layer, Full Decrypt at Plant1 (P1)
would have been performed by an IoT device which clearly
justifies that our proposed security feature has successfully
reduced the computational burden on the resource constrained
end devices. Moreover, Partial Decrypt at Plant2 (P2) is
performed by a fog node which otherwise would have been
performed by a proxy server in the Cloud. Thus, our proposed
architecture also eliminates trust on the Cloud by offloading
major computations to the fog nodes.
D. Secure Computation
Computation Overhead: The computation overhead of Fog
Node at Plant2 (P2) for this scheme arises from Key Genera-
tion and Decryption.
Key Generation = (2TE + TP ) (for Key-pair)
Decryption = TP + TE + TD
Communication Overhead: The communication overhead of
Fog Node at Plant1 (P1) for this scheme is because of the
transmission of CT and res′′.
CT = 128 bytes (CT1) + 128 bytes (CT2) = 256 bytes
res′′ = 128 bytes (res′′1 ) + 128 bytes (res
′′
2 ) = 256 bytes
Total communication overhead = 256 bytes + 256 bytes = 512
bytes
Thus, we can conclude that in the absence of the fog nodes
these tasks would have been performed on sharing information
among some third party entities (e.g. gateway, cloud). Thus,
we can claim that our proposal mostly eliminates trust on such
third party entities except for storage and archival purposes.
APPENDIX D
TESTBED DESIGN
We conduct experimentation through testbed where Rasp-
berry Pi (RPI-3B) is the IoT device acting as the sender. A
Laptop acts as the Fog Node and ThinkSpeak which is a cloud
server is running on a desktop. Finally a user is operating at
a remote terminal to retrieve data from the system. Figure 7
shows our testbed design.
APPENDIX E
METRICS OF SUCCESS
We highlight the metrics of success based on the perfor-
mance evaluation results of our proposed secure fog based
architecture.
• More Secure: To the best of our knowledge, there hasn’t
been any such works reported which develops a Secure Fog
based architecture for IIoT and Industry 4.0. Plugging and
playing each of the individual features separately becomes
a tedious process, specifically in industrial environments
where huge amounts of data processing takes place at any
given time instance and one or more of these features maybe
required to be applied. We have been able to successfully
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Fig. 7: Testbed Setup of Secure Data Sharing with Multiple Users
secure the architecture at the cost of appreciably acceptable
communication, computation overheads and execution time
discussed in Tables II-V, VIII respectively (Section V).
• Reduced Overhead on Low End Devices: By choosing the
appropriate security schemes and applying them intelligently
has also helped us to minimise the communication overhead
of the resource-constrained end devices. For example, in
case of Secure Data Aggregation, the communication over-
head of Aggregate BLS is comparatively lesser than BLS
as a single aggregated signature of size 96 bytes is to be
transferred. Thus, we have achieved preferably low commu-
nication overhead at the cost of a little larger computation
overhead. Also by offloading the tasks to the fog nodes we
have been able to considerably reduce the computational
burden on the resource-constrained devices at the perception
layer. For example in the said security feature, Fine-Grained
Access Control with Improved Performance, in the absence
of a Fog layer, Full Decrypt (At P1) would have been
performed by an IoT device which clearly justifies that our
proposal has successfully reduced the computational burden
on the resource constrained end devices. Additionally by
reducing the computational burden on the low-end devices,
the latency in determining the output also reduces.
• Reduced Latency: By applying appropriate schemes and
offloading major tasks judiciously to the more powerful Fog
nodes, the latency in decision making can be considerably
reduced. For example, in case of Secure Data Aggregation, a
Fog node may receive data packets for signature verification
from multiple industrial equipments at the same time. In
such a scenario, the Fog Node has to verify a single
signature in case of Aggregate BLS compared to BLS where
it has to verify each of the received signatures. This greatly
reduces the latency in decision making.
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